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ABSTRACT 
Digital Forensics is one of the latest challenges for the use of forensics in the investigative process 
in the United States. Some of the challenges are created by conditions and circumstances present 
for law enforcement around the world. However, many are unique to the United States and created 
by the standards of evidence within our courts, nature of our law enforcement organizations, and 
structure of our judicial and prosecutorial systems. It is essential for the preservation of public 
security and individual safety that competent systems of digital forensics are developed for law 
enforcement at all levels. The failure to do so will let the guilty avoid responsibility for their criminal 
actions while possibly subjecting the innocent to unprecedented government intrusion into their 
private lives. 
Keywords: digital forensics, law enforcement, public security, technology, cyber security 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital Forensics is: " ... use of scientifically 
derived and proven methods towards the 
preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation of digital 
evidence derived from digital sources for the 
purpose of facilitation or furthering the 
reconstruction of events found to be criminal or 
helping to anticipate the unauthorized actions 
shown to be disruptive to planned operations" 
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(Palmer, 2001). Digital forensics arose in 
response to the digital age and with all of the 
advances and positive contributions to our 
ability to communicate, work and play more 
effectively and efficiency. Simultaneously, the 
abuses and misuses of digital forensics also 
arose. At no other time in history has society 
been so dependent on technology and its various 
offshoots and incarnations (United Nations, 
1999). 
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Technology has changed the way in which 
we interact as a society (NRC, 2002; Rogers, 
2003). The US Census Bureau estimated that 
in the year 2001, e-business retail sales totaled 
$34 billion (US Bureau of Census, 2002). 
Estimates of e-business retail sales for 2015 
totaled $340.4 billion (US Bureau of Census, 
2017). This represents an increase of 900 
percent over this fourteen-year period. 
Similarly, individuals are increasingly using the 
internet. The US Census reported that in 2012, 
7 4.8 percent of total US households reported 
that someone in the household had access to the 
Internet from some location. For individuals 44 
years and younger, the rate of access was over 
80 percent (US census, 2014). 
Similarly, in 2000, 53 percent of US 
residents reported that someone m the 
household accessed the Internet from some 
location. In 2012, this rate of reported use had 
increased to 75 percent (US Census, 2014). Of 
those accessing the internet in 2012 , 69 percent 
reported access from home and 75 percent from 
hone or some other location. In 2015, 
approximately 95 percent of US respondents 
reported owning a cell phone with 77 percent 
reporting owning a Smartphone. This is up 
from 83 percent cell phone and 35 percent 
smartphone ownership m 2012 (PEW 
Foundation, 2017). 
With the advent of increased technology 
and increased use of technology comes misuse. 
Not all misuses of electronic devices are crimes. 
Cybercrime takes various forms but is generally 
defined as "crimes committed through the use of 
digital devices as either the object of a crime, 
the instrument to commit a crime, or a 
repository of evidence related to a crime" 
(Agarwal, et. al., 2011). 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 2011 a survey of 50 large US companies found 
that the median cost related to cybercrime in 
2011 was $5.9 million. This represents a 56 
Page 48 
percent increase over the median cost reported 
in 2010 (Cybercrime Research Center, 2011). 
The forms of cybercrime reported were mixed 
but more insidious such as malicious code, 
denial of service and Web-based attacks. It took 
an average of 18 days and $417,748 to clean up 
the attacks an increase from the 14 days and 
$247,744 reported in 2010. The average number 
of successful attacks reported was 72 per week, 
up 44 percent from the previous year 
(Cybercrime Research Center, 2011). 
Similarly, individuals report various types of 
Cybercrime on an increasing frequent annual 
basis. In 2000, there were 16,838 complaints of 
internet crime to the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center. By 2011, the number of complaints had 
increased to 314,246 totaling an estimated 
$485 .3 million in losses. The most frequently 
reported crimes were: advanced fee scams (9%), 
identity theft ( 9%), FBI-related scams ( 11 % ) 
and (7%) non-auction or non-delivery of 
merchandise (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 
2011). In 2016, the number of complaints filed 
was 298,728 with a reported $1.33 billion in 
victim losses (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 
2016). The US Federal Trade Commission 
reported that in 2009, 26 percent of all 
complaints involved some form of computer-
related crimes. The specific crimes in included: 
credit card fraud ( 17%), theft of government 
benefits or documents (16%), and theft of phone 
or utilities (15%) (Federal Trade Commission, 
2010). 
Also, apparent within these trends is the 
increased use of the cell phone as a repository of 
criminal evidence. Cell phones are now a major 
crime scene item that is captured and analyzed 
in the course of the investigation of the full 
range of crimes. Law enforcement agencies are 
also increasingly relying on cell phone-related 
evidence. In a survey conducted in 2007, law 
enforcement commanders reported the belief 
that cell phone evidence was frequently involved 
in both violent crimes and drug offenses. 
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Approximately 40% of the commanders believed 
cell phone evidence was involved in 51 % or more 
of all violent crimes and approximately 50% 
that cell phone evidence was involved in 51 % or 
more of all drug offenses (Losavio, et. al., 2007). 
Digital forensics units report that more than 
70% of their examinations involve cell phones 
(Personal Correspondence, FBI Regional 
Computer Forensics Lab Program National 
Advisory Committee, May 2012). 
While digital evidence is becoming more 
prevalent, this boom in technology poses 
significant challenges for law enforcement. Even 
today, computer security and digital forensics is 
evolving and will continue to do so because as 
technology changes so must efforts for security 
and digital forensics. Digital forensics, as a 
discipline, has progressed through three stages, 
to date (Charters, 2009; Pollitt, 2010). Digital 
forensics and computer security were preceded 
by the development of computers in 1947 and is 
defined as the beginning of the Industrial Era of 
Computing (History of Computing Foundation, 
2010). The first phase of digital forensics is the 
Ad Hoc (Charters, 2009) or Infancy (Pollitt, 
2010) stage. Computers were generally 
mainframe computers and the possession of 
large organizations. Personal computers were in 
use and were powerful but were not user friendly 
and had relatively few applications that could 
be of general use to individual "hobbyists" 
(Pollitt , 2010). This was the "pre-forensics" 
stage characterized by a lack of structure, goals 
and clear policies and procedures to govern the 
identification and collection of digital evidence. 
Evidence was collected but the quality 
questioned due to unclear policies within 
organizations concerning employee "use" of 
corporate property and "ownership" of 
employee's work products on corporate 
computers. Accuracy of forensic tools and 
"chain-of-custody" issues were significant in that 
there were few, if any, court decisions 
concerning digital evidence during this era. Law 
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enforcement agencies were beginning to use 
digital evidence, but training was limited, 
examiners were often individual investigators 
with an "interest" in computers and therefore, 
digital forensics "operated in direct conflict with 
the traditional, laboratory-based practice of 
forensic science" (Pollitt: 8, 2010). The second 
phase of digital forensics, Childhood, extended 
from 1995 through 2005 (Pollitt, 2010). It is 
characterized by tremendous growth not only of 
digital forensics applications and policies, 
regulations and laws related to the use/ misuse 
of computers and other electronic devices but of 
individual use/ misuse of electronic devices and, 
most notable, the "explosion of child 
pornography cases" beginning with the George 
Stanley Burdynskim Jr. case in 1993 (Pollitt , 
2010). Additionally, this era encompassed the 
events of September 11 , 2001 and the use of 
computers by terrorists and a lack of expertise 
on the part of law enforcement and the military 
to handle these events. The need for specialized 
training due to the increased volume of cases, 
increasing complexity of technology and 
growing knowledge within the field became 
increasingly evident. Field came to develop 
through impetus from government agencies and 
specialize digital forensics organizations. 
The next phase, Adolescence, covered 2005-
2010 (Pollitt, 2010). With this phase came 
increasing legal specification that defined digital 
information as evidence and specified a 
mechanism for eDiscovery (Manes, et .al., 2007). 
Academic and detailed, advanced training 
programs grew as did the complexity and 
maturity of devices to be examined. "Virtually 
every device that use( d) electricity ha( d) some 
form of digital storage. Wired or wireless 
networks connect(ed) many of the devices we 
use(d) in our daily lives" (Pollitt: 12, 2010). 
Organized processes and procedures for the 
identification, collection, analysis, preservation 
and presentation of digital evidence were 
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developed by law enforcement, the military and 
the intelligence community. 
The development of digital forensics within 
American law enforcement has and continues to 
face many challenges. These include: access to 
digital services; training and equipment needs 
( economic issues); lack of standardization; legal 
issues related to the validity and reliability of 
digital evidence ( forensic science versus 
technology); increased complexity of digital 
evidence ( cloud computing, hard drive 
encryption, size of data to be seized/ analyzed) 
and related digital issues. However, the over-
reaching issue is that of cultural lag relative to 
technology and the law/ ethics that exists and 
continues to drive much of the social behavior 
related to the use of technology. 
2 .1 Access to Digital Services 
The United States has approximately 18000 law 
enforcement agencies, each with a unique 
geographic and legal jurisdiction. Each funded 
differently with no consistent standards for law 
enforcement training, equipment, services, or 
policies and procedures. As such, the 
availability of digital forensics resources is 
extremely uneven among law enforcement 
agencies throughout the United States. Some 
law enforcement agencies, generally the federal 
agencies and largest US police departments have 
their own digital forensics units for purposes of 
examining, analyzing and preserving digital 
evidence. However, large jurisdictions, those 
with 1000 or more sworn personnel constitute 
only .4% of all local police agencies in the US. 
In fact, most police agencies, 95.4% have fewer 
than 100 sworn personnel and are responsible 
for jurisdictions with fewer than 25000 in 
population (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013). 
A survey of law enforcement agency digital 
forensics resources was conducted in 2005. A 
total of 576 law enforcement agencies were 
surveyed. A majority of the agencies (72.3 
percent) did not have a dedicated digital 
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evidence unit and another majority (58.1 
percent) had no digital evidence policies. Only 
approximately one half had digital forensics 
awareness training. Similarly, most (57.5 
percent) reported the collection of digital 
evidence in from O to 5 percent of their 
investigations (Pollitt, 2005). Another survey 
of police commanders reported that 35% 
responded they had failed to use digital ( cell 
phone) evidence in criminal cases due to a lack 
of access to expertise to extract and preserve the 
digital evidence (Losavio, et.al., 2007). 
Clearly, the emphasis on local law 
enforcement and lack of consolidation of law 
enforcement within the United States has 
resulted in "uneven" access to digital evidence 
resources. This includes awareness training on 
digital evidence ( what is digital evidence, why 
it should be seized at the crime scene), as well 
as access to resources to extract and preserve 
digital evidence in criminal cases. While some 
of the variation in digital forensics may be the 
product of decisions by leadership within these 
agencies, it is, in all likelihood, more directly 
related to economic factors. 
Several projects have sought to remedy this. 
For example, the Secret Service provided 
training and equipment to departments around 
the country willing to dedicate staff to this. 
Continued expansion of this capability will be 
crucial to public security. 
2. 2 Training and Equipment 
Nea:Js 
"The collection of electronic data as evidence of 
crime is an important responsibility given to law 
enforcement. The technical constraints of this 
task are arguably far less significant than 
usability and economic ones, since police officers 
are non-specialists and police departments face 
significant budgetary limitations" (Moore: 1, 
2006). The primary constraints on digital 
evidence practice for law enforcement agencies 
are economic rather than technical. Training in 
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digital forensics examination techniques is very 
expensive, and may cost as much as $10,000 for 
basic training in data extraction and upwards of 
$20,000 for training in more specialized digital 
examination techniques such as extraction of 
data from damaged hard drives (Personal 
Correspondence, FBI Regional Computer 
Forensics Lab Program National Advisory 
Committee, May 2012). Additionally, one-time 
training is not sufficient because as technology 
changes, skills must be enhanced, and so regular 
in-service training is required on at least an 
annual basis. 
In addition to the training, digital forensics 
requires complex hardware and software that 
may cost tens of thousands of dollars. And, 
while the needs for data extraction on some 
devices such as personal computers may be 
conducted using many available tools due to 
standardization of hard drives, storage on 
devices such as cell phones and smart phones is 
within the phone's internal memory, is absent 
standardization and within locations that vary 
depending on the model. Even cords used to 
transfer information are not standardized. As 
such, cell phone examination is much costlier 
and requires specialized software and cables that 
are ever increasing with the release of new phone 
models. 
Because of the size of their jurisdiction, 
number of sworn personnel, and the frequency 
of crime, budgets are limited, and the start-up 
and ongoing costs of digital evidence equipment, 
software and training may not be cost effective. 
However, even with larger law enforcement 
agencies, the economics are pressing and bear 
fixed costs with some additional marginal costs 
associated with the extraction (Moore, 2006). 
When access to the digital resources of a large 
police agency or central state forensics unit is 
available, that access may increase the marginal 
costs of the data collection. For example, the 
time for a police investigator to drive 60 or 100 
miles carrying digital devices for examination to 
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a centralized department results in higher 
personnel costs, transportation costs and may 
make the "chain-of-custody" more complex and 
potentially problematic. 
2. 3 Lack of Standardization 
Lack of standardization within digital forensics 
is significant in several ways. 1) There is no 
standardization across all law enforcement 
agencies concerning the appropriate 
"investigative" model. For example, Agarwal, 
et. al. (2011) identified and discussed four prior 
investigative models as well as their currently 
proposed (Systematic Digital Forensic 
Investigative) model. The need for a 
standardized procedure within digital forensics 
is critical for the nature of the discipline, i.e., 
justification of the discipline as scientific rather 
than technical; establishing benchmarks in the 
investigation of crimes involving digital 
evidence; meeting legal challenges based on the 
integrity and admissibility of digital evidence; 
and create comparability of investigative 
techniques nationally. 2) As noted previously, 
access to digital forensics resources is not 
standardized across law enforcement 
jurisdictions and therefore, the ability to use 
digital forensics varies by agency and geographic 
location. 3) There are no standards for what 
constitutes "appropriate" digital forensics 
examination training, no standards for 
"appropriate" digital forensics examination 
techniques and no standards for "appropriate" 
digital forensics tools. "Experts" within the 
discipline are, for the most part, self- defined 
though those within the FBI CART are 
generally recognized as having some of the most 
detailed and complete training. Proprietary 
sources for the software and hardware generally 
determine "adequacy" of their proprietary 
training that is "purchased" along with the 
hardware and/ or software to be used in the 
digital forensics process. Whether students 
"pass or fail" is not an issue and may or may not 
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be recorded by any other than the agency 
sponsoring (paying for) the training. 
The American Society for Crime Lab 
Directors has an official board (Lab 
Accreditation Board) that accredits digital 
forensics labs. It is currently the only 
accrediting body for crime labs. Similarly, one 
non-proprietary group for testing computer 
forensics software, National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer 
Forensics Tool Testing ( CFTT) division is a 
government entity that performs tests on 
software. Similarly, the FBI's Technology 
Division performs tests on digital examination 
software and hardware as a means of 
determining whether the devices meet the 
standards set for these tasks by the organization 
itself. These regulatory bodies are not sufficient 
to keep pace with changes in computing and 
electronic devices. 
A survey was administered to digital 
forensics examiners in 2003 (Rogers and 
Siegfried, 2004). These respondents expressed 
concern over an absence of national standards 
for digital forensics. Specifically, they were 
concerned there were no national certifications 
for digital forensics and the linkage between 
several current certifications and vendors such 
that the vendors certified the customers on 
proprietary tools. As noted by the authors, 
" ... proprietary certifications only increase the 
level of fragmentation within the industry and 
perpetuate the misguided belief that there is no 
generic conceptual approach to computer 
forensics" (Rogers and Siegfried, 2004: 15). 
2. 4 Admissibility of Digital 
Evidence 
Evidence gathered through all forensics 
disciplines must meet basic evidentiary and 
scientific standards if it is to be used in legal 
proceedings. The US Supreme Court set these 
standards in the decision in the case of Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). 
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The decision set standards for determining the 
scientific basis of evidence because the law views 
scientific evidence as more reliable and therefore 
more acceptable than non-scientific evidence. 
The process under Daubert identifies four 
general categories to use in the assessment of 
evidentiary procedures: Testing ( Can and has 
the procedure been tested?), Error rate (Is there 
a known error rate of the procedure?), 
Publication (Has the procedure been published 
and subject to peer review?) , and Acceptance 
(Is the procedure generally accepted in the 
relevant scientific community?). 
Whether or not digital evidence meets the 
standards of admissibility under Daubert is and 
will continue to be a recurring issue. 1) Testing 
- This legal standard asks whether a forensics 
tool can and has been tested to prove that it 
produces accurate results. Organizations such 
as National Institute of Standards and 
Technology have performed and published 
digital tools but, to date, no standard testing 
methodology exists. Most often, problems with 
open and closed source applications are 
identified by users in the field. The users then 
report the problems to the vendors. The 
vendors make the necessary changes but may 
not be motivated to report these findings , 
generally, to the public or justice practitioners 
(Carrier, 2002). Similarly, 2) Error rate - This 
standard asks whether there is a known error 
rate for the procedure. Manufacturers of digital 
forensic tools do not necessarily want to provide 
a "known error rate" for their tools. In fact, 
promoting the error rate would simply be "bad 
for business." As such, when major errors are 
reported by users, the manufacturers simply 
make changes to the tools ( new and in-service) 
without drawing too much attention to the 
problems with their "product." 3) Publication -
Whether the procedure has been published and 
subject to peer review. As digital forensics has 
matured as a science, so have the number of 
research projects and publications on the 
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various tools. Much is, however, still 
proprietary and protected with the 
manufacturers conducting internal validation 
research on their own products, making the 
changes necessary, without publication of the 
results. Only with the field user or organization, 
such as the FBI that methodically validates all 
instruments used in the digital forensics process, 
are the tools validated and the results published 
and distributed for general consumption. In 
some instances, even these validation studies 
carried out by the FBI are not published since 
identification of a weakness with a digital 
forensics tool might call into question 
convictions based on the findings from this 
instrument and/ or provide offenders with 
information to more efficiently perform the 
activities involved in cybercrime without 
detection. 4) Acceptance - The last standard 
assesses whether or not the procedure is one 
that is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community. The interpretation of this 
standard is varied. On the one hand, the digital 
forensics tool vendors argue that numbers of 
customers are a measure of "acceptance" in the 
relevant scientific community. However, 
customers are "users" and "users" are not 
necessarily "scientists" but rather trained 
professionals who use the tools developed and 
vetted by the scientist. When number of 
customers is not used, scientific publications 
become a criterion and, as such, the limitations 
discussed in the "Publication" standard would 
apply. 
Since 2007, the US Federal District Court 
has rendered more than 1000 court opinions 
concerning cell phones and their use as evidence 
or sources of evidence within criminal 
proceedings (Law.Justia.Com, downloaded May 
15, 2012). Additionally, since 2008, the US 
Federal District Courts have rendered more 
than 500 opinions concerning digital evidence. 
While not all were questions related to the 
admissibility of this type of evidence in the 
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specific cases, the op1mons addressed various 
legal issues related to this newest form of 
scientific evidence (Law.Justia.Com, 
downloaded May 16, 2012). 
Judicial determinations are based on 
findings of fact that are informed by the not 
only the law but the general knowledge of judges 
on the specific topic. The extent to which 
judges are familiar with electronic evidence and 
systems may affect decisions concerning the 
admissibility of digital evidence. A survey of 
judges in 2005 found that while the majority 
(75%) expected significant changes in the future 
and felt they needed significant training (95%) 
in digital evidence, only a minority actually had 
experience in digital evidence. Only 5 percent 
reported handling cases involving email 
evidence and 3 percent website or Internet 
evidence. However, when used, 17 percent 
reported email evidence was frequently or 
almost always challenged with 20 percent 
reporting similarly for website or Internet 
evidence (Losavio, et.al., 2006). If judges do not 
understand digital evidence, it may be more 
difficult to make a determination concerning its 
admissibility and therefore challenges to digital 
evidence may be more numerous and affirmed 
more frequently. 
2. 5 fucreased Complexity of 
Digital Evidence 
Law enforcement agencies are dealing with 
increasingly large amounts of digital evidence. 
The agencies have moved from analysis of bytes 
to megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes and 
petabytes. Personal computers now hold more 
information and more processing power than the 
corporate mainframe of 15 years ago. Digital 
examiners must have the capability to process 
large amounts of information and to do it 
accurately, completely and in a timely manner. 
This requires advanced equipment and therefore 
results in additional costs that are not 
necessarily part of the budget of most US law 
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enforcement agencies. Similarly, law 
enforcement agencies will soon be addressing 
more issues related to encryption as computer 
companies begin to mass produce personal 
computers with self-encrypting hardware - more 
training, more equipment , more costs. Lastly, 
issues such as "cloud computing" raise serious 
questions requiring legal clarification. That 
which is most specific is "who" owns the 
information an individual stores in a proprietary 
"cloud" and what reasonable expectations for 
privacy can an individual have when operating 
in a proprietary "cloud" environment. What can 
vendors be required to do in terms of 
notification to consumers and public reports on 
law enforcement information requests relative to 
"cloud" computing? Which entity should be 
named in the warrant - the vendor or the 
customer? These are complicated issues that 
will need to be addressed within a relatively 
short amount of time. 
2.6 Other Issues 
Perhaps the greatest challenge that faces not 
only US law enforcement but all law 
enforcement involved in digital forensics is 
cultural lag. Cultural lag is a term coined by 
William Ogburn (1922). It refers to differences 
between technology and the "non-material" 
components of a culture in which there is a "lag" 
between the material (technology) and non-
material culture. Since technology changes at a 
rapid and ever-increasing rate, the ethical 
"guides" for use of technology are in a constant 
state of "lag" since social norms and values do 
not change at the same rate as that of 
technology. 
Marshall (1999) raised the issue of cultural 
lag and argued it is appropriate and important 
to address whether new technologies introduce 
ethical problems. The development of social 
guidelines and norms for technology becomes 
even more significant when technological change 
creates great cultural shift due to rapid diffusion 
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across a wide range of human activities 
(Marshall, 1999; Robinson, 1981). Such is the 
case with computing. Normative, legal and 
ethical issues surround technology and multiply 
as technology changes and becomes more 
distributed throughout the everyday lives of 
members of our society. Some of the issue are 
normative such as etiquette related to cell phone 
use or practical considerations related to the 
consequences of what individuals choose to post 
on Facebook pages. Others are related to ethics 
and include issues of Internet postings, using a 
roommate's computer without permission or 
"sexting" on a PDA. Many are not only 
unethical but also illegal. Many times, however, 
the illegal or unethical nature of acts is not 
recognized - at least not initially, until 
realization is made of the "harm" that occurs or 
can occur. Who would have thought that there 
would be a need for laws related to the 
distribution of pornographic images of children 
over the Internet or that a specialized form of 
"bullying" that is, cyber bullying would emerge? 
American society is diverse. The 
development of values, beliefs, ethics, and laws 
does not occur in a controlled focused 
environment. Instead, it occurs through 
individuals with widely divergent backgrounds, 
knowledge, skills, etc. Changes in cultural 
norms, values and belief systems is not specific 
and does not emerge quickly. Unlike the 
development of technology, there is no market 
structure to reward changes in the non-material 
culture. That is, those who ponder and assist 
in the development of ethical standards are not 
rewarded monetarily. It is not possible to 
develop ethical standards until after-the-fact 
that is, until after the development of new 
technology. As such, our understandings, 
ethics, beliefs and social guidelines related to 
technology use will always "lag" behind the rate 
of development of technology itself. 
Some of the cultural lag is evident in the 
development of law at the highest levels, the US 
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Supreme Court. This court has had to, after-
the-fact, develop new standards fore-Discovery, 
to determine whether or not cell phone 
companies are obligated to provide law 
enforcement with cell phone information that 
would track the activities of their customer. 
Standards of privacy and reasonable 
expectations of privacy have been redefined in 
response to electronic technology. In the past, 
many of the Supreme Court rulings were based 
on the premise that individuals did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when in a 
public area/ situation. Most recently, the US 
Supreme Court decided that our citizens do 
have a reasonable expectation to privacy in 
public places when ruling on the legality of 
search and seizure in a case in which law 
enforcement used GPS to track the movements 
of a suspect in a recent case. In the ruling, one 
Justice rendered a solo opinion stating that 
individuals had more of a right to privacy in 
data held by phone and Internet companies 
than the Supreme Court had held in the past 
( _____________ _ 
__ , downloaded May 16, 2012). 
3. RElVIEDIATION 
POSSIBILITIES 
There are a variety of possibilities for the 
remediation of these obstacles to the 
deployment of digital forensics resources. One 
project, for example, has tested linking a federal 
Bureau of investigation regional computer 
forensics laboratory (RFCL) with local law 
enforcement mini-laboratories for analysis 
directed using a triage model to allocate 
resources to cases. Each participating agency 
or agency division provided, among other 
things, secure laboratory space, a dedicated 
employee, employee training, and use of the 
digital forensics facilities. The project provided 
computer hardware, digital forensics suite of 
examination software (AccessData's FTK and 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
MPE suites) and training on these systems and 
software. 
The results demonstrated both the capacity 
for greatly expanding digital forensic services 
where there was commitment to use them. 
Table 1 contains the results for one agency 
assigned a full-time staff/ officer to conduct 
examinations, produced the following result in 
roughly one-year period: 
These examinations included a variety of 
crimes: murder, robbery, rape, unlawful 
imprisonment, assault, narcotics trafficking, 
child pornography and child sexual exploitation. 
The initial cases were child 
pornography/ exploitation cases. However, over 
the one-year period, use of the services had 
expanded to address other kinds of cases, 
including homicide, rape and robbery. This 
indicates the shift towards use of digital 
forensics as an investigative tool across the 
criminal justice spectrum. It is worth noting 
that as the project evolved, these services were 
used by other law enforcement agencies, 
including the federal Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Kentucky 
State Police. 
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Table 1. 
Number and Type of Examinations 
Se ptember # # Cell Other 
2011 Computers phones 1 
- July 2012 (SIMs) 
September 6 
October 5 18 12 
November 5 
December 7 
Januarv 2 1 
Februarv 3 13 7 
March 2 10 3 
April 9 4 
Mav 1 4 3 
June 23 9 2 
Julv 1 5 2 
totals 14 88 22 
Another participating agency, which had 
been conducting its own digital forensics 
examinations, integrated the new tools and 
training into its operations. The data from its 
operations showed a significant shift from the 
examination of computers and related 
peripherals to the examination of cell phones for 
evidentiary purposes; approximately one third 
of the examinations were for outside agency 
seeking assistance with digital forensics 
examination. Similarly, another local law 
enforcement agency with a pre-existing digital 
forensics capacity and school online safety 
program also found a strong trend towards 
examination of mobile devices over that of 
computers . While the majority of cases 
continued to be child pornography, 
examinations were also part of investigations for 
drug trafficking, counterfeiting, forgery and a 
car bombing. 
This project demonstrates that when 
provided services along with the willingness to 
use them; law enforcement agencies quickly find 
that digital forensic services play a role in nearly 
all forms of misconduct. Growth in the use of 
MicroSD cards are counted as separate devices 
although they are associated primarily found 
associated with cell phones in these examinations
TomTom GPS lEX00
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digital forensic services was also furthered by 
expansion of the examination of mobile devices 
relating to criminal misconduct. 
Another project that promoted the 
distribution and use of digital forensics services 
were online, activated, distributed software 
tools with hardware connector kits and online 
training made available to qualifying law 
enforcement agencies. The forensic tool 
provided for data acquisition, analysis and 
reporting relating to cell phone examinations. It 
offered keyword searching and transactional 
timeline, frequency and linkage visualization for 
phone, text and web activity on the device. 
Analysis of data from one month of system 
use showed a broad use by many agencies 
municipal, county, federal and state law 
enforcement, including the Office of the State 
Fire Marshall, Lincoln University Police 
Department and the Kansas Department of 
Wildlife and Parks -- examining many different 
kinds of devices, cell phones predominated: 
Total successful exam logins - 210 
# agencies using system - 40 
# different mobile devices - 7 4 
# different manufacturers - 12 
Data entry was inconsistent , with about one 
quarter noting the crime with which the 
associated device was being examined; those 
crimes included homicide, aggravated rape, 
aggravated assault and narcotics offenses. 
The widespread and rapid adoption of this 
system again supports the conclusion that where 
resources and training are easily available, they 
will be adopted quickly by law enforcement as 
tools for crime investigation and prosecution. 
Includes a tablet computer
Secure View 3 Case Management-Analytics: 
http: //www.mobileforensics.com/ svProbe (accessed 
July 9, 2012) 
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4 . IIVIPLICATIONS 
Computer crimes are highly impersonal, in most 
instances . They involve behaviors not generally 
addressed through existing moral standards. 
There is no need to face the victim when 
engaging in the crime. There is no need to 
observe the harm created by the illegal 
behaviors. Offenders generally only think of the 
implications of what they as one individual are 
doing and do not think of the implications of 
spreading this harm among millions of 
individuals and therefore, magnifying the harm. 
There exists only limited understanding of the 
perpetual nature of cyberspace and consequent 
harm. 
Computer crimes additionally raise new 
challenges for the laws and only as new crimes 
emerge from the misuse of new technologies, 
laws must be changed and developed to address 
previously unknown issues. Technology also 
introduces a wide range of new vulnerabilities 
criminals can use to take advantage of their 
victims. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The expansion in both the presence of digital 
devices in relation to a crime locus as well as the 
use of digital devices as tools for the commission 
of crimes will continue, particularly as we see 
the growth of the Internet of Things and the 
present of interconnected devices everywhere. 
These provide both opportunities for crime as 
well as opportunities for investigation to solve 
those in other crimes. It is essential for the 
preservation of public security and individual 
safety that competent systems of digital 
forensics be available for all levels of law 
enforcement. The failure to do so will let the 
guilty avoid responsibility for their criminal 
actions while possibly subjecting the innocent to 
unprecedented government intrusion into their 
private lives. This is abhorrent to the rule of law 
and deserves our full attention. 
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